Supreme geopolitical flirt: what’s the meaning of Saudi Arabia’s shift towards multi-alignment?

Image Attribution: Kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

Since 1945, Saudi Arabia has been a pretty faithful ally of the USA: a Watson to the US’ Holmes, a Robin to their Batman, a Sam to their Frodo, a Luigi to their Mario… Recently, however, it appears to be cosying up to America’s strategic opponents. But is what we’re observing here really a substantial shift, or just a tactic to get the US’ attention? And, if it is a substantial shift, why is it happening and what does it mean?

The basis of a long-lasting relationship

The foundation of the long-standing Saudi-US alliance was the premise that Saudi Arabia would provide reliable access to oil, and manipulate global oil prices to the Americans’ convenience (e.g. reducing prices before elections). In return, America would provide security guarantees against the Saudis’ regional opponents, alongside access to weapons and cutting-edge military training. Throughout the 50s and 60s, American companies nurtured the growth of the Saudi oil industry, and both countries collaborated to counter Soviet-allied reformist movements in the Arab world such as Ba’athism and Nasserism. These movements were largely secular, socialist and republican - three words which don’t greatly enthuse the royal house of Saud. 

There were, of course, times at which the Saudi-US alliance came under strain, particularly over Israel (which, to this day, remains a point of misalignment). Most notably, the US’ support for Israel in the Yom Kippur War (1973) prompted Saudi Arabia and five other Arab countries, as a protest, to reduce their oil production in order to drive up prices - which eventually quadrupled - and to stop exporting oil to the US and other countries that were aiding Israel. In response, the Nixon administration threatened military intervention. Ultimately, however, this rift was patched over as the Yom Kippur War was swiftly brought to a close, and the alliance remained intact. 

In the following decades, Saudi Arabia and America continued to cooperate to limit Russian and, more broadly, socialist influence in the Middle East. They both provided substantial military support to the Afghans fighting against Soviet occupation in the 1980s and, during the Gulf War (1990-1), the Saudis harboured over 400,000 Kuwaiti refugees fleeing the Iraqi invasion and allowed their territory to be a base for the US-led coalition forces, for which they also provided vast quantities of funding. 

Even the disproportionately large participation of Saudi nationals in 9/11 - Osama bin Laden was from a wealthy Saudi family and fifteen of the nineteen hijackers hailed from the kingdom - did not destroy their strategic alliance with the US. Although the Saudi monarchy questioned the American decision to invade Iraq, they were fundamentally aligned with the US’ goal of stamping out al-Qaeda which, after all, was also launching attacks on them. 

But times are changing. Saudi Arabia has not quite gone all ‘single and ready to mingle’, but is, let’s say, ‘interested in an open relationship’. The regime is increasingly cosying up to America’s strategic opponents, such as Russia and China. Particularly since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, Chinese-Saudi economic ties have been growing. For instance, the Chinese Harbour Engineering Company was awarded a contract to build and operate a port in Jizan, in 2022 Saudi Aramco decided to invest billions of dollars in a new refinery and petrochemical site in northeastern China, and a Saudi Arabian fund recently helped to finance a leading Chinese AI company, Zhipu AI. Most significantly, China is now Saudi Arabia’s biggest oil customer and trading partner, the value of trade between China and Saudi Arabia having increased from $500m in 1990 to $87bn in 2021. This most probably lies behind the Saudis’ offer in late 2024 to use the Yuan instead of the dollar to settle oil payments with them. 

Perhaps even more alarming for the US, Saudi Arabia’s strengthening ties with China extend beyond economics into the realm of security and diplomacy. For example, In 2021, China began supporting Saudi Arabia to make its own ballistic missiles (endangering the US’ efforts to negotiate a new nuclear deal with Iran). Furthermore, in late 2022 Xi Jingping and MBS signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement (involving making 34 investment agreements, stating an intention to work together to drive forward the digital economy, and pledging to “firmly support each other’s core interests”, “expand Saudi-Chinese relations in their international framework”, and “develop cooperation and coordination in defense fields”, alongside many other things). Following the spirit of collaboration manifested in that agreement, in early 2023, it was China that facilitated the diplomatic reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 

A similar trajectory can be seen with Russia. In 2015, the Saudi Arabian Public Investment Fund and Russian Direct Investment Fund agreed to a partnership and, in 2017, they decided to go in together on promising investment opportunities in Russia. Particularly key to this relationship was the decision to launch OPEC+ in 2016, which added ten non-OPEC countries, including Russia, to the OPEC alliance. As de facto co-leads of the organisation, working together to manage global oil prices, Saudi Arabia and Russia’s geopolitical and economic ties grew stronger. What is more, they took decisions as a pair which did not align with the expressed interests of the USA, and went against the grain of how the Saudi-US partnership was supposed to operate. For example, in October 2022, despite Biden’s injunction to increase oil production to reduce prices in the run-up to the mid-terms, OPEC+ decided to cut oil production, causing a price increase. On top of all this, in 2023 Saudi Arabia became a dialogue partner in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, a political, economic and security alliance set up by China and Russia, and it has not yet turned down the invitation it received to join BRICS in 2024. 

Some commentators have framed this phenomenon as part of a strategy employed by several Gulf states, where they flirt with China and Russia to remind the US of their strategic importance and cement their commitment to the alliance. The implication of this argument is that Saudi Arabia is not really interested in diversifying its geopolitical friend pool, only pretending to do so as a negotiating tactic. The sudden ramping up of dialogue with China in the wake of Biden, who had described Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) as a “pariah”, becoming president, supports this view. However, the trend of Saudi Arabia getting closer to America’s strategic opponents is arguably too consistent and long-lasting to be a mere bargaining chip, particularly given that it was also observable during Trump’s first term, even though Trump had not taken the rhetorically hardline stance against Saudi Arabia that Biden would go on to take. What we’re seeing is a real shift with geopolitical significance, and not just ‘art of the deal’ fluff. 

It’s also important to consider, when evaluating the significance of the shift we’re observing, that it’s being driven by America’s strategic opponents too. For instance, during the Qatar-Gulf crisis (2017-2021), when Saudi Arabia and several other countries cut off relations with Qatar, China reduced its own cooperation with Qatar to avoid risking their relationship with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Although the Gulf isn’t viewed as amongst the most important strategic regions by China or Russia, both countries are still seeking to deepen their relationship with Saudi Arabia because doing so generates significant perks for them. In China’s case, Saudi Arabia’s geographical location makes its cooperation pivotal to the success of the BRI, which aims (amongst other things) to create a kind of ‘new silk road’ overland and by sea, better connecting China with her trading partners, hopefully adding some new ones to the list, and more broadly increasing the volume of trade between China and the rest of the world. China is also very dependent on the Gulf states to meet its energy requirements and is keen to increase the volume of oil trading conducted in non-dollar currencies, as this weakens the petrodollar system that plays a crucial role in buttressing US global influence. Russia also stands to gain from this, as well as from having Saudi Arabia’s cooperation in shaping global oil markets. Both countries could also benefit from preferential treatment when it comes to the spending decisions of Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund which, at over £700bn, is the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world. 

All this is not to say that the Saudi-US relationship is dead. Far from it. Saudi Arabia clearly still takes care not to alienate their old ally. For example, the CEO of Alat, a company aiming to make Saudi Arabia a global electronics hub and backed by the Public Investment Fund, suggested that he would be willing to divest from Chinese companies if that was required to protect partnerships with the US. This is likely because the company’s sense is that these US partnerships can currently help them more than those with China in driving forward Saudi Arabia’s ambitions to be a global leader in technology innovation. Likewise, despite Saudi Arabia’s disapproval of Trump’s real-estate-mogul-inspired solution to the Israel-Gaza crisis, it has largely directed its criticisms towards Israel, rather than POTUS himself. 

There are specific strategic reasons for this. Importantly, Saudi Arabia does not yet have one single weapons supplier that could replace the US, and still relies on American security guarantees. But there’s also currently an element of the personal at play. MBS and Trump have long had a very powerful bromance, bonded over their love of making money, being strongmen, and perpetuating family dynasties. MBS no doubt also appreciates that Trump takes a more transactional approach to leadership than Biden, and isn’t that interested in lecturing them about pesky issues like democracy and human rights. 

So, to bring this all together, Saudi Arabia is genuinely seeking to deepen its ties to China and Russia, but also wants to remain good chums with the US. They’re determined to make multi-alignment work. A recent statement from Faisal Alibrahim, the Minister of Economy and Planning, captures this: “we want to be in the middle; our partnerships should remain strong with all stakeholders”. Also indicative is Saudi Arabia’s non-committal stance towards the BRICS invite. To BRICS or not to BRICS? That is the question MBS is refusing to answer. 

From ‘in a relationship’ to ‘it’s complicated’: what explains Saudi Arabia’s shift towards multi-alignment?

There are several factors at play here. Firstly, American global dominance is much more contested now than it was when Francis Fukuyama astutely noticed in 1989 that history had in fact ‘ended’. As a consequence, Saudi Arabia is sensible to start taking some of its eggs out of the American basket. Secondly, America is becoming a less reliable ally as attitudes to how far the ‘Land of the Free’ should collaborate with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are increasingly split along partisan lines. The Republicans are generally more friendly towards Saudi, and the Democrats less so. As mentioned previously, Biden labelled MBS a “pariah” in the wake of the killing of Jamal Khashoggi, and published CIA intelligence which indicated that the Crown Prince himself had approved of the murder. It was only through gritted teeth that Biden agreed to meet MBS, concerned that Saudi oil and weapons-purchasing power was getting too close to China. 

Perhaps even more importantly, whilst both countries still need each other in a quid-pro-quo kind of way, their broader geopolitical strategies are increasingly in conflict. Under Biden, the Democrats’ approach was to glue together an alliance against Russia and China that was unified at least nominally by anti-autocratic sentiment, and to increase the significance of shared values as a determinant of their international alliances. For instance, the White House’s national security strategy stated that the US would collaborate directly with other democracies but only work indirectly - through international frameworks - with non-democracies, a snub to the Saudi-US relationship. Furthermore, with China as their biggest trading partner and Russia as their most important collaborator in managing the global oil market, a geopolitical strategy based around opposition to these two powers is unlikely to resonate with MBS. 

US energy policy is another topic which will be ringing alarm bells for MBS. First, there’s the Democrats’ push to accelerate the energy transition. Whilst it’s true that Saudi Arabia is trying to carve out a role for itself within this transition, ultimately they are still trying to slow the pace, as they remain a petro-state. Second, both the Democrats and the Republicans are increasingly stressing the importance of domestic energy independence, an emphasis partly enabled by technical developments unlocking greater domestic fossil fuel supplies. American domestic energy independence would remove the central piece of leverage Saudi Arabia has in the relationship. 

Saudi Arabia’s strategic misalignment with the Republicans and Democrats also crucially derives from the fact that, in general, they continue to cling to the idea of American dominance, whereas MBS predicts and is preparing for a more multi-polar world, bringing in substantial opportunities for middle powers like Saudi Arabia to exert greater influence, in line with the substantial economic and geopolitical ambitions he outlined in Vision 2030. MBS’ wants more for his country than being the side-kick to a hegemonic US. 

Can Saudi Arabia make the ‘open relationship’ work?

Saudi Arabia, and indeed several other Gulf states, are attempting to walk a geopolitical tightrope, where they maintain alliances with America and its strategic opponents. In Saudi Arabia’s case, this is because the country still relies on the US with regards to weapons provision and security, but both countries’ broader geopolitical strategies and hopes are increasingly out of joint. The question is, can they do it? There is certainly some annoyance on the American side towards Gulf states deepening their relationships with China and not obeying American injunctions. For instance, the former US Secretary of Commerce, Gina Raimondo, sharply reminded the UAE that “you can’t be in both the Chinese and our camps when it comes to emerging technologies”. Similarly, after OPEC+ ignored Biden’s request to increase production to lower oil prices, Biden declared in irritation that the US would need to rethink their relationship with Saudi Arabia. 

Nonetheless, for Saudi Arabia at least the strategy does appear to be working. The dogs that didn’t bark in the night are a meaningful retaliation from the US to Saudi Arabia’s clearly deepening connection to their strategic opponents, or a translation of Biden’s harsh words against MBS into significant action. Despite his disgust at the murder of Khashoggi, Biden still felt compelled to go on an official visit to Saudi Arabia where he, somewhat awkwardly, gave MBS a fist-bump. Likewise, his anger at OPEC+ not agreeing to increase oil production before the mid-terms didn’t result in any substantial negative response in practice. The reason for this is that Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves, pivotal role in controlling global oil prices, and position as the top purchaser of American weapons makes them too important to knowingly alienate. The first two points only increased in significance since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war. What is more, the Crown Prince is still a favourite at the court of the Donald, indicated by the fact that Trump was happy for Saudi Arabia to be the primary host of the peace talks over the Russia-Ukraine war, and the recent discussions about Saudi Arabia gaining access to US nuclear technology, which has long been an ambition of theirs. 

So what should we take away from all this? Saudi Arabia’s seemingly successful shift towards multi-alignment has a broader significance than just pointing towards the decline of American hegemony. It is of critical importance for middle powers struggling to successfully navigate their way through an increasingly turbulent geopolitical landscape, and trying to increase their country’s international influence in the process. Saudi Arabia’s ability to make the open relationship work demonstrates how middle powers with some form of key strategic leverage (whether deriving from abundant oil supplies, a near monopoly on a critical mineral, a unique contribution to the semiconductor chip production process or anything else) can carve out new kinds of geopolitical positions in the shift towards a more multipolar world, which don’t require an ‘either/or’ choice but instead offer the opportunity to select ‘both/and’. 

By Courtenay Crow

Recommended Resources

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - China and Russia in the Gulf - a Cacophony of Influence and Interest (Oct 2024)

Foreign Affairs - The Kingdom and the Power: How to salvage the US-Saudi relationship (Dec 2022)

Chatham House Interview with Adel al-Jubeir - Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (2019)